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Australia has argued within the Pacific
Forum for a regional approach to dealing
with the economic and social problems
experienced in several of the member states.
Australian Prime Minister John Howard,
who campaigned strongly for the election of
an Australian candidate to the position of
Secretary General of the Forum, foreshadowed
the main tasks of the new appointee as
enhancing greater cooperation and
accelerating economic development through
better governance in many of the poorly
performing member economies. In the final
communiqué from the 2003 meeting held in
Auckland, the Forum Leaders identified the
following three issues for immediate attention
• greater cooperation between the members
in pooling the scarce resources of the
region to strengthen national capabilities
• a concerted effort to tackle corruption, and
improve governance more generally
• a stronger collective focus on regional
security (The Australian Financial Review,
18 August 2003:2).
The anxieties of the largest and richest
member of the Forum, and one under some
threat from global insecurity, are
understandable: but is such a stance in the
interests of the smaller member states? If
designed and implemented with adequate
care, the proposed Pacific Economic and
Political Community (PEPC) could be of
mutual benefit to all participants; the risks
associated with realising such an outcome
are also discussed.
Australia has changed its foreign policy,
particularly towards its smaller island
neighbours located in the Southwest Pacific,
following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
and terrorist attacks in New York and Bali. It
would, however, be wrong to suggest that
the push for a PEPC by the Prime Minister
was a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to these recent
events. The Australian Government has been
increasingly concerned at the poor, and in
some cases deteriorating, state of economic
development in several of its island
neighbours. Many of these same nations
have been recipients of large amounts of
Australian technical assistance and aid. The
poor developmental record, therefore, is at
least partially an indictment of this assistance.
A Senate Committee charged with reporting
on Australia’s relation with the Pacific
provided a long-term vision for a ‘Pacific
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Economic and Political Community’ as a
means of providing ‘meaningful and
significant income assistance to PNG and
Pacific island countries at the same time
being of benefit to the Australian economy’
(Australia, Senate Committee Report
2003:xviii). This indeed was not the first such
proposal as several previous studies had
argued for deeper integration as a means of
accelerating economic development in the
island states. The Senate Committee saw the
proposed PEPC as a means of raising the
pace of economic development, and thus
fostering peace and political stability in the
immediate neighbourhood.
New Zealand, the other key beneficiary
from such an outcome, has remained silent
on the proposal other than to reject the use
of the Australian dollar as the regional
currency. The smaller Pacific nations have
remained silent except for the Prime Minister
of Fiji who has also snubbed the idea of a
regional currency. Opposition to a political
unification, of which currency unification
would be an integral component, is under-
standable since it would amount to some loss
of sovereignty for individual island nations.
However, European countries have been able
to balance the loss of sovereignty against the
gains they anticipate from integration within
the European Union, even to the extent of
adopting a common currency. From an
economic perspective, the use of the
Australian dollar as the regional currency
would imply a loss of freedom in economic
policy as it would effectively transfer
monetary policy to the Reserve Bank of
Australia. Again, this loss of monetary (and
fiscal) independence should be balanced
against the benefits of discipline over fiscal
policy that would ensue.
The critical question with respect to the
proposed economic unification is whether it
would be in the interests of the individual
members? If it is in their interests, then how
can the community be designed and
implemented so as to maximise the develop-
mental benefits while containing the risks?
It is often claimed that the Pacific island
economies are disadvantaged because they
are small and geographically isolated. On
the question of whether the size of an
economy is a key determinant of economic
viability, the evidence is clear. Given that
several small economies (Norfolk Islands as
an example) have done exceptionally well
in developmental terms, size of an economy
cannot be the major determinant of economic
viability. Within the Pacific region, Niue and
Tuvalu, the smallest of the island economies
are not amongst the worst performing states
while Papua New Guinea, the largest of these
countries, is under severe developmental
strain. While geographical isolation from major
markets is estimated to have a negative impact
on economic growth, it is not a large impact.
Is currency unification for the proposed
Pacific Economic and Political Community a
necessary and sufficient condition for
accelerating development? Again the answer
is in the negative. Several countries within the
region have adopted the Australian, New
Zealand or US dollar and they do not have
better performance than those with their own
currency. Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu use the
Australian dollar; Cook Islands and Niue use
the New Zealand dollar; while the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands,
and Palau use the United States dollar.
Given that the small size of the island
economies does not point to the need for
political unification to ensure economic
viability and the fact that currency unification
is not sufficient for accelerating development,
is the proposed PEPC a futile idea? Again,
the answer is in the negative. A community
of the nature proposed could accelerate
growth if a suite of policies is adopted, with
implementation of the key components
sequenced to generate maximum benefit. For
example, the goods and factor (labour in
particular) markets would need to be better
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integrated before a single currency was
introduced. Such a currency union would
only survive if fiscal discipline and price
flexibility were already well anchored in the
individual members. The proposed PEPC
could provide the momentum for freer goods
trade and factor mobility in the initial phase.
This could then be followed by fiscal
responsibility clauses for the individual
members if they were to graduate to adopting
the common currency. Proposals for political
unification should be left to the very end since
there are few identifiable developmental
benefits from such unification while it has the
potential to act as a major stumbling block to
deep economic integration.
Old wine in a new bottle
The idea of pooling resources, particularly
amongst the smaller states, is not new. The
several bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements that have been established in the
region endeavour to achieve the same goal of
freer flows of goods and services (World Bank
2003:Chapter 1). However, establishment of
regional activities is a somewhat different
matter. The leaders at the most recent Forum
endorsed scoping studies (to be funded by
Australia) on ways of sharing airline and
shipping services. Both Air Pacific and the
Forum Shipping Line were created on these
very considerations. Both have had very
limited success in meeting the aspirations of
their creators; while Air Pacific gravitated
towards becoming a Fiji airline, the Forum
Shipping Line remains a regional activity but
has as yet to return a dividend to the owners.
The reasons for the gulf between reality
and intent in relation to Air Pacific and the
Forum Shipping Line must be investigated
prior to embarking on yet another regional
airline or shipping service. Even if the
resources to start a regional airline could be
raised, there is a strong likelihood of
opposition from existing airlines. Why would
profitable national carriers such as Air
Pacific, Air Vanuatu and Polynesian Airlines
give up their privileged positions for a new
regional carrier? Why would their govern-
ments, as the largest shareholders, support a
proposal that erodes the position of the
national flag carrier? It has been difficult
enough to privatise loss-making airlines such
as Air Niugini; the suggestion to amalgamate
national flag carriers into a single regional
carrier is tantamount to political unification,
a task not to be taken on lightly. Even in the
unlikely case of the creation of a regional
carrier, would it offer the benefits of economies
of scale as purported?
The contrasting performance of Air
Pacific and the Forum Shipping Line provide
many lessons for the proposal for regional
enterprises to serve shipping and aviation
services. One of the major challenges facing
a communally owned service provider is to
balance considerations of minimum service
obligations with returning profits to the
shareholders: this is trying to meet two, and
often-competing objectives, with the one
instrument—a contravention of Tinbergen’s
principle of good public policy of ‘one
instrument for each policy objective’. Both
Air Pacific and the Forum Shipping Line
were caught in this bind: while Air Pacific
took the path to commercial viability, the
Forum Shipping Line held on to serving its
members. Not surprisingly, the latter has
continued to make losses while keeping the
equity partners together while the opposite
happened to Air Pacific. What guarantee is
there that a regional airline or shipping
company will not follow one of the above
mentioned trajectories? Let’s consider some
other cooperative initiatives by the members
of the Pacific Forum.
Several regional organisations have been
created over the past three decades. The
relatively successful ones include the Forum
Secretariat (formerly the South Pacific
Economic Cooperation Bureau), the South
Pacific Commission (now known as the
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Secretariat of the Pacific Community) and the
University of the South Pacific (USP). Of
these, USP is perhaps the best demonstration
of successful regional cooperation, but it is
far from being a commercial enterprise. Even
in this case, small island nations such as
Samoa and Tonga have created or maintained
their own universities, with many fewer
resources than the regional university. Much
akin to the experiences of Air Pacific and the
Forum Shipping Line, there is benefit in
scrutinising the reasons for the large
diversity in performance of regional bodies
in relation to the original intent for their
creation. Such considerations are essential
for two reasons: first, to avoid repeating
mistakes, and second, to avoid the need to
dismantle such bodies, as experience has
proved this to be a very difficult task.
Australian concerns relating to regional
security, particularly in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks on New York and Bali, may
indeed be new and deserve detailed consider-
ation. The region does not have formal
arrangements for defence cooperation, thus a
case may now exist for such an arrangement.
The Biketawa Accord did consider proposals
for a regional peacekeeping force; this could
be expanded to cater for the new demands
relating to maintaining regional security.
With the benefit of hindsight, such a force
could have served as a deterrent to the
military coups and the ensuing political
instabilities leading to economic paralysis
in Fiji and Solomon Islands. Or better still,
their presence could have deterred the
usurping of legal authority. The recent
meeting of the Forum endorsed the Australian-
led military and police intervention in
Solomon Islands, but a credible force able to
deal with such instabilities may have at best
prevented the crisis and at worst contained
it at a much earlier stage and well short of
the damage done to date, and of the resources
needed to rescue the situation. The Biketawa
Accord could be expanded to incorporate a
proposal for a rapid deployment capacity
stationed with the member defence forces.
The proposed revamping of the Fiji Police
College, with funding from Australia of A$17
million to be spread over five years, to meet
the training demands of the smaller island
nations, could also act as the hub for a
regional police force. The College could
provide the virtual linking of the forces
stationed in member countries; indeed, there
is no better way than for college alumni to
continue to work together in a regional
capacity. In summary, regional security
concerns are new but could be accommodated
within the context of the Biketawa Accord:
that is, this new consideration could be
effectively packaged within an existing
regional arrangement.
Smallness and economic viability
Smallness does not necessarily imply non-
viability of an economy as there are several
small economies that have done exceptionally
well in terms of economic development. There
is cross-country evidence that well-managed,
small economies have outperformed both their
poorly managed cousins as well as their much
larger counterparts. While size does create
particular problems, smallness does not
constitute an insurmountable development
hazard. The challenge for policymakers is to
draw lessons from the successes and emulate
these within the less successful economies.
Many of the factors important to
development are identical for both large and
small countries. For example, the critical
ingredients for development such as clear
and enforceable property rights, good public
infrastructure, an open trading environment,
and an accommodating international
trading environment are common to both
small and large open economies.
Small economies are more open than
large countries in terms of the share of trade
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in GDP. The narrow resource base of small
economies prevents them from satisfying the
diverse demands of domestic consumers.
Hence, these economies are more reliant on
international trade than their larger counter-
parts. The reliance on a narrow range of
export commodities to earn foreign exchange
exposes the economies to greater volatility
in such earnings due to reduced opport-
unities for income diversification. Hence,
supply shocks at home or price shocks from
abroad lead to greater volatility in income
and demand in small vis-à-vis large
economies. Small economies, by definition,
lack market power in the global market place;
this is as much a strength as a handicap.
While small economies are at the mercy of
global commodity prices, they face infinitely
elastic demand for their commodity exports.
The thinness of foreign exchange markets
in small economies is one of the factors that
has dissuaded them from adopting freely-
floating exchange rate regimes. Given their
greater openness, larger exposure than large
countries to external shocks, and thin foreign
exchange markets; small countries often
adopt fixed exchange rate regimes and/or
their central banks intervene heavily in order
to maintain exchange rate stability. Such
actions limit the ability to use monetary
policy for macroeconomic stabilisation. The
small size also limits the ability to use
discretionary (strategic) trade policy for
improvements in domestic welfare. Exchange
rate policy is used sparingly and only in
extreme situations, given the need to maintain
credibility of the domestic currency.
Consequently, fiscal policy is used as the
major tool for economic management
(Chand 2002).
Small isolated states face several
problems that have the potential to constrain
economic activity. Most of these disadvantages
emanate from lack of economies of scale, often
implying the lack of a sufficiently large
population and domestic resource base to
allow production of goods and services at
the minimum efficient scale. Geographical
isolation raises transportation costs,
imposing a competitive disadvantage on
high bulk-to-value exports such as primary
commodities. A higher degree of specialisation
follows from efforts to secure economies of
scale in production, marketing, transport-
ation, and distribution. The industries that
are established tend to be those requiring
minimal economies of scale such as small-
scale agriculture, boutique tourism, and
assembly activity such as clothing. Some
import-competing industries survive due to
a combination of high levels of natural and/
or regulatory protection, public sector
subsidies, and the presence of large resource
rents that fund downstream processing.
Lack of scale economies could be a
serious handicap to growth since recent
developments in endogenous growth theory
suggest that scale is necessary for growth-
enhancing activities, including research and
development and learning-by-doing (see
Arrow 1962; Romer, 1986; Lucas 1988; Barro
and Sala-I-Martin 1995; and Aghion and
Howitt 1998). But greater specialisation
increases exposure to movements in inter-
national prices and quantity shocks such as
those arising from adverse natural conse-
quences that in turn are manifested as output
and export instability. Examples of the latter
include the recent taro blight in Samoa that
nearly decimated the industry, and a severe
downturn in tourist arrivals in Vanuatu in
1998 due to hail damage to its lone jet-aircraft.
The jury is still out on the extent to which
the factors listed above have constrained
growth in small economies. After extensive
empirical testing, Easterly and Kraay (2000)
came to the conclusion that smallness is not
a disadvantage to development, arguing
that on average small states have higher
incomes than their larger counterparts. This
claim has not gone unchallenged as noted
in Blake (2001), but what is clear from several
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similar analyses is that the constraints to
growth of output faced by small states can
be overcome; but doing so demands good
economic management. Easterly and Kraay
also claim that the ingredients and recipe for
growth of production is the same for all
countries and suggest that unwarranted
attention has been paid to the problems of
small states. I have argued elsewhere (Chand
2002) that there is considerable, albeit not
total, overlap in development problems faced
by small and large economies; four issues
peculiar to small states and relevant for the
discussion here are enumerated next.
First, their small markets are often able
to sustain only a few and sometimes only a
single supplier. This thinness of the market
can confer market power on the incumbent(s),
thereby constraining competition—a
necessity for achieving efficient allocation of
resources. However, if there are no barriers to
imports of competing goods or services, the
ensuing contestability will place a limit on
the ability of the monopolist to extract
abnormal profits. Second, an absence of scale
economies reduces the range of non-traded
services produced by the private sector. This
often provides the rationale for public sector
participation in commerce. National airlines
and state-run utility companies in small
states are created and often supported with
taxpayer funds on the premise that it fills
the void left by the private sector; but this
very support also acts as a barrier to private
sector participation. Developing country
experience with state-owned enterprises in
terms of their profitability, sustainability,
and efficiency of resource use, has been poor.
In some cases, problems of small markets
may be overcome by changes in technology.
The telecommunications industry is a good
example. In this case wireless technology
has meant that the earlier need for large-
scale markets to support the building of
fixed-line facilities is no longer important.
Third, the small population of small
states limits the pool of available skills
including those for economic management.
Furthermore, the small size of the population
means an even smaller group of élite, which
hampers ‘arms-length’ governance, and
therefore creates the conditions for nepotism
and corruption; this is what Harberger (1988)
calls the ‘tyranny of demography’. Poor
governance leading to poor economic manage-
ment penalises development. Fourth, and as
explained earlier, small, open economies tend
to peg their domestic currency to the currencies
of their major trading partners as a means of
minimising exchange rate volatility. When the
capital account is open, this policy imposes
a cost to economic management by limiting the
effectiveness of monetary policy in demand
management.1 Furthermore, adverse terms of
trade shocks with downward rigidity in
domestic prices lead to an appreciation of
the real exchange rate, to the detriment of
domestic competitiveness, thus exacerbating
the recessionary impact of the initial shock.
In summary, small states have more
volatile income and have limited capacity
to mitigate the effects of international shocks
on domestic production, employment, and
prices. The best that these states can do is to
learn to cope with and be prepared for such
volatility; the international community can
facilitate but not initiate such a process.
Small states face problems that are due to
their size, but these are surmountable
challenges requiring commensurate capacity
in economic management. Thus, smallness
on its own cannot be a sufficient reason for
the Pacific island states to enter into an
economic and political community, but doing
so may make good economic management
easier whilst not alleviating the need for the
same. However, there are prerequisites for the
proposed PEPC to deliver a higher and more
sustained rate of growth of income for the
communities of the region.
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Prerequisites for the proposed
PEPC to deliver
In deciding to adopt a common currency
such as the Australian dollar (or a ‘Pacific’
dollar as suggested by the Governor of New
Zealand’s central bank), the members of the
proposed Pacific Economic and Political
Community would need to weigh up the
benefits against the costs of such a proposal.
It is critically important to note that a
package of policies must be adopted if the
proposed PEPC is to deliver a higher rate of
economic development while at the same
time underpinning long-term regional
security. Such a package will, inevitably,
constrain policy choices within individual
countries and as such incur costs.
The members of the proposed community
would first need to be convinced that each
would gain individually from joining;
otherwise side-payments may be required to
induce those that otherwise pay a price for
the benefit of the group collectively. The most
likely candidate to satisfy the requirement of
collective benefit without needing side-
payments is freer movements in goods,
services, capital, and labour—such deep
integration would need to be accompanied
by unification of codes and standards. The
benefits from deep integration may induce
the members to pursue fiscal and financial
integration; fiscal integration is necessary
condition if a common currency is to be
adopted. Political unification may follow
implementation of free mobility of goods,
services, and factors of production within the
region, accompanied by common codes and
standards including the use of a single
currency. The benefits from each of the
above three steps will, in all likelihood fall
as unification is deepened; it may very well
be that the case for political unification may
not arise for a considerable while yet.
Conclusion
The Australian Prime Minister, at the 2003
Forum Leaders meeting in Auckland, made
a strong case for greater pooling of the
region’s resources to strengthen regional
capacity while inducing greater peer
pressure, particularly amongst the leaders,
for better governance. There is little debate
on the legitimacy of this position. Within this
context, the case for a collective initiative on
regional security threats is also sensible. But
extending the concept of regionalisation to a
Pacific Economic and Political Community,
on the premise that the small island states
individually are not economically viable, has
little basis. Niue and Tuvalu, the smallest of
Pacific island states, are in far better shape
than their much larger and more resource-
abundant neighbours in Melanesia.
Moreover, the suggestions for a regional
airline, shipping service and single currency
may be both overly ambitious and politically
naive.
One sensible way to proceed to greater
unification within the region but with an open
trade regime is to embark on deep integration
involving freeing up of restrictions on
movements of goods, services, capital, and
labour in the region. Locking in with the trade
liberalisation agenda of Australia may assist
the members to resist domestic lobbies
opposed to such reform. Freer movement of
labour may allow several of the island states
to complete major downsizing exercises
within their public service and the
disciplinary forces, as it would provide an
exit for workers made redundant in the
process.2 These steps could lead to the
unification of the region’s financial markets;
a natural outcome of such a process may well
be demands for a single regional currency
from within the membership. Demands for
political unification, in all likelihood, would
come last given that benefits from unification
are likely to be a lot smaller than those from
124
Policy dialogue
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Pacific Economic Bulletin, Volume 18 Number 2, November 2003 © Asia Pacific Press
the preceding steps. The suggestion for
political and economic unification in the
same breath thus could have been counter-
productive.
The proposal for a Pacific Economic and
Political Community, if it is to materialise,
must be pushed in three distinct stages, with
an option for the members to opt out from the
unification process at any stage of the game.
The first stage would entail deep trade
integration involving removal of all regulatory
impediments to trade in goods, services, and
factors of production. Such a process will
necessarily involve unification of codes and
standards. The second step would entail
setting of fiscal standards and unification of
the financial sector; a single regional
currency may follow as a consequence. Only
after completing these latter two stages
should political unification be given any
thought. The gains from each of the above
steps will be positive but of smaller magnitude
than the previous step while costs, particularly
in political terms, could rise with each step.
Continued participation with an option to
opt out will be evidence of net positive
benefits from being part of the process. From
the regional perspective, the resulting
position may be improved by allowing side-
payments; but even thinking about this
possibility is a risk given the existing
problems of poor governance.
Notes
1 Note that in the case of perfect capital mobility
with a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy
is ineffective in demand management.
2 Previous attempts to downsize the armed
forces in all of Melanesia have failed due to
tough resistance from those affected—the
simple lesson for the reformers being that you
do not ‘fire’ those with ‘fire arms’.
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